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Abstract 
When exchange parties are faced with the risk of opportunistic and uncooperative behaviour, 
they have a range of control responses at their disposal. These responses include the type of 
structure governing the exchange (i.e. to make, buy or ally) as well as the design and operation of 
management control systems (MCS) embedded within the arrangement. However, what is less 
clear is how these different control responses interact and combine, in particular, how decisions 
to ally within a hybrid governance structure shapes the choice of embedded MCS. In this study, 
we seek to exploit the natural occurrence of two contrasting inter-organisational arrangements 
within the same institutional setting: a flexible subcontracting arrangement and a limited life 
equity alliance. By comparing these cases, we explain two implications of hybrid governance 
structure variation: first, how control is enacted at a structural level; and second, how structural 
dimensions influence the design and operation of embedded MCS. Our results demonstrate that 
hybrid governance is not simply the generic inter-organisational context where management 
control occurs; instead, alternative hybrid structures – characterised by varying degrees of 
formalisation, centralisation and relational governance – have different control solving 
capacities. In addition, each hybrid governance structure’s unique control capacity influences the 
design and operation of embedded MCS. This is because some MCS are used to complement the 
strengths of each hybrid structure; whereas other MCS are used to compensate for each hybrid’s 
structural deficiencies in relation to certain control problems or transactions. 
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1. Introduction 
Idiosyncratic inter-firm transactions expose parties to the risk of self-interested, opportunistic 
behaviour by their trading counterparts (Arrow 1969; Coase 1937; Williamson 1985). Parties 
may exploit bargaining positions to hold-up negotiations or take advantage of information gaps 
to misrepresent their capabilities ex ante or to shirk effort ex post (Neumann 2010). There are 
several ways parties can respond these types of ‘cooperation control problems’, including the 
structuring of the inter-firm arrangement, partner selection, management control systems (MCS), 
or contractual safeguards (Anderson & Dekker 2010; Caglio & Ditillo 2008). However, as most 
prior inter-firm studies have examined these control responses in isolation, it is not clear how 
alternative control responses operate in combination. The purpose of this paper is to explain the 
interdependence between two control responses found within a given inter-firm arrangement: the 
nature of the hybrid governance structure and the choice of embedded MCS. To do so, we 
investigate two inter-related research questions: first, how control is enacted at a structural level 
by alternative hybrid governance structures; and second, how alternative hybrid governance 
structures influence the design and use of embedded MCS? 
In inter-firm accounting research, hybrid governance is often equated with ‘inter-organisational 
relationships’ (e.g. Caglio & Ditillo 2008; Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman 2000), which 
may be problematic in two respects. First, there is a danger of treating hybrids as a homogenous 
category of that constitute all inter-firm arrangements besides pure market contracting. As 
organisational economics reveals, the category of hybrid governance comprises a rich variety of 
organisational forms –  ranging from long-term bi-lateral contracting agreements to  multi-party 
strategic alliances – each of which are ascribed with their own attributes and governance 
properties (Ménard 2004, 2013). Second, ‘inter-organisational relationships’ are often used as the 
context within which accounting researchers have explored how control is enacted by different 
forms of MCS. However, if the structure of that relationship also addresses opportunism, as 
transaction cost economic (TCE) theory suggests it would (Williamson 1985, 1991), then 
treating it simply as context to control could create distorted, under-specified or incomplete 
views of inter-organisational management control (Anderson & Dekker 2010; Caglio & Ditillo 
2008). 
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The issues in how hybrid governance structures have been conceptualised may also contribute to 
inconsistencies in the portrayal of the relation between hybrid governance structure and 
embedded MCS. For example, some studies imply that particular MCS configurations are 
constitutive of alternative hybrid archetypes (e.g. Speklé 2001); whereas others portray 
governance structure and MCS as successive choices within an path-dependent ‘extended-make-
or-buy decision’1 (e.g. Johansson & Siverbo 2011; Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman 2000). 
Both these approaches suggest that cooperation control problems are addressed by both hybrid 
governance structure and MCS responses; however, without further clarification about the nature 
of their interdependence, it is difficult to explicate actually how they can be designed and 
operated, potentially in combination, to address opportunism in inter-firm settings. 
In this study we take advantage of the natural occurrence of two different inter-organisational 
arrangements – a flexible subcontracting arrangement and a limited life equity alliance – that 
have both been used to administer research and development (R&D) exchanges within the 
Australian cotton industry. Studying inter-firm R&D contracts provides an opportunity to 
examine the types of specialised, uncertain transactions that are characteristically prone to 
potential opportunism (Gulati & Singh 1998; Oxley 1997; Williamson 1985). Furthermore, by 
conducting an in-depth comparative case study of the two arrangements, we are able to exploit 
the variation in hybrid structure to contribute two theoretical implications to inter-organisational 
management control research.  
The first implication concerns how control is enacted at a structural level. Using three structural 
dimensions - formalisation, centralisation and relational governance – we provide a systematic 
categorisation of the control capacities of alternative hybrid governance structures. The structural 
dimensions not only describe the characteristics which differentiate alternative types of hybrid, 
they also explain how the structures themselves address cooperation problems. Market-like 
hybrid governance structures, through vertical relational governance, centralisation of property 
and investment rights, and short-term exchange formalisation, combat opportunism by 
generating supplier competition and providing incentives for cooperative behaviour. In 
comparison, hierarchy-like hybrid governance structures, with long-term associational 
                                                 
1 Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman (2000) suggest that in an extended make-or-buy decision, a party first 
decides the governance structure of a transaction, followed by the type of parties and relational risk to accept, and 
finally the design of MCS.  
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formalisation, centralisation of property and managerial rights and intense lateral relational 
governance, mitigate opportunism by creating interest alignment between parties and reducing of 
exploitable information asymmetries.  
The second implication concerns how each hybrid governance structure’s unique control 
capacity influences the design and operation of embedded MCS. To disentangle the types of 
interdependencies between control responses we examined patterns in how hybrid governance 
structure and embedded MCS combined in response to three different cooperation control 
problems across the two cases. We observed that some MCS are used to complement the 
strengths of each hybrid structure; whereas other MCS are used to compensate for each hybrid’s 
structural deficiencies in relation to certain control problems or transactions. Based on these 
results we differentiate between three types of hybrid-MCS relations embedded within an 
‘extended make-buy-or-ally’ decision: complementary relations, where MCS enact each hybrid 
structure’s functioning; endemic compensatory relations, where MCS provide additional 
safeguarding for each hybrid’s structure-wide deficiencies in relation to certain control problems; 
and, idiosyncratic compensatory relations, where MCS safeguard each hybrid’s structural 
deficiencies in relation to particular sets of transactions. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the conceptual framing of the study. 
We integrate developments in inter-organisational management control and organisational 
economics literatures to formulate three cooperation control problems in inter-firm transactions; 
the potential control responses; and, the types of possible inter-dependencies between those 
responses. In Section 3 we describe our comparative case approach, outlining the procedures for 
data collection and analysis of the two inter-organisational arrangements. In Section 4 we present 
our case findings, applying the conceptual framework to explain how each arrangement’s hybrid 
governance structure and MCS address each of the three cooperation problems. Then in Section 
5 we discuss the implications of cross-case patterns in the hybrid-MCS relations for our two 
research questions, before placing the work in the context of future inter-organisational 
management control research in Section 6.  
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2. Conceptual framing  
The conceptual framework shaping our study, depicted in Figure 1, comprises of three 
interrelated elements which are developed in the following sections. First is the nature of 
cooperation control problems found in inter-firm transaction contexts. Second are the possible 
hybrid governance structure and MCS control responses to cooperation problems. Third, are the 
possible inter-dependencies between alternative hybrid governance structures and embedded 
MCS.    
<INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE> 
Cooperation control problems in inter-firm transactions 
Inter-organisational cooperation control problems exist whenever “autonomous partners … have 
incentives to cheat and free-ride in order to attain their own specific goals at the expense of the 
objectives of the collective undertaking, so they [the partners] need to introduce mechanisms to 
align their objectives” (Caglio & Ditillo 2008, p.891). This imperative for control arises due to 
the risk of opportunistic behaviour, that is, when one party acts out of their own self-interest at 
the cost or detriment of others (Simon 1957; Williamson 1985). Although the risk of 
opportunism may pervade all economic activities, when organisations choose to contract with 
external parties this risk is heightened, as there is neither the alignment of interests that a shared 
ownership structure provides, nor the capacity to enact managerial fiat through hierarchical 
control (Arrow 1969; Coase 1937; Williamson 1985). Furthermore, the severity of cooperation 
control problems is generally highest for idiosyncratic transactions, as high uncertainty 
constrains parties’ ability to specify complete contracts for all contingencies, and high asset 
specificity creates dependency between contracting parties (Williamson 1979, 1985, 1991).2 
Most previous inter-organisational control studies formulate a single aggregate cooperation 
control problem based on a general risk of opportunism (e.g. Dekker 2004; Johansson & Siverbo 
2011; Langfield-Smith 2008; Langfield-Smith & Smith 2003; Speklé 2001; Van der Meer-
Kooistra & Vosselman 2000). However, there are different forms of opportunistic behaviours, 
                                                 
2 A third transactional characteristic – frequency – is also associated with cooperation control problems as low 
transactional recurrence reduces the long-term cost of opportunism (Shelanski & Klein 1995; Tadelis & Williamson 
2013; Williamson 1998). However, the empirical support for this attribute is much less consistent (Macher & 
Richman 2008). 
7 
 
such as lying, stealing, cheating or efforts to misrepresent (Williamson 1985), which will likely 
to give rise to different types of control problems that require alternative control responses 
(Neumann 2010).3  Therefore, in this study we follow Neumann (2010) in decomposing the 
cooperation control problem category into specific variants. She suggests that hybrid partners 
may not only be confronted with risk their counter-party will exploit bargaining positions to 
hold-up4 negotiations, but also that they may take advantage of information gaps to either 
provide distorted information or shirk effort.  
In addition, these cooperation problems may not always occur simultaneously; they are likely to 
arise at different times during a contracting relation. We can conceptualise three successive 
phases of a contracting relation: the ex ante development of a contract, the selection and 
investment decision at the point of contract, and the ex post execution and fulfilment of the 
contract (Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman 2000). As summarised Table 1 below, at the ex 
ante phase, exchange parties may be confronted with the risk of costly setup and negotiation of 
projects because of dependence on specialised providers. At the point of contract they risk 
making poor investment decisions due to supplier misrepresentation of their capabilities or the 
parameters of the transaction. Finally in the ex post phase, parties face difficulties in evaluating 
and enforcing contract compliance in the context of incomplete contracts, information 
asymmetry and the parties’ mutual  dependence on one another. 
<INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE> 
Control responses to cooperation problems 
Inter-firm parties facing the risk of opportunistic behaviour have a variety of control responses at 
their disposal (Anderson & Dekker 2010; Caglio & Ditillo 2008). Two responses include: the 
                                                 
3 This same logic also differentiates cooperation and appropriation control problems. Several authors treat 
appropriation and cooperation concerns as synonymous (e.g. Dekker 2004; Gulati & Singh 1998; Sampson 2004; 
Speklé 2001; Vosselman 2012), likely because both are forms of behavioural issues (Arrow 1969; Coase 1937) that 
emerge when one assumes bounded rationality and opportunism (Williamson 1985).  Appropriation control 
problems arise because of the risk of theft of property and unfair division of value between parties (Gulati & Singh 
1998; Leiblein, Reuer & Dalsace 2002; Oxley 1997; Pisano 1989; Sampson 2004; Teece 1986); whereas 
cooperation control problems arise because of the risk of a broader range of self-interested behaviours by 
autonomous trading counterparts. 
4 ‘Hold-up’ refers to when a contracting party intentionally stalls negotiations or engages in excessive haggling 
tactics to persuade their trading counterpart to accept more favourable contracting terms (Geyskens, Steenkamp & 
Kumar 2006; Rindfleisch & Heide 1997). 
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selection of an appropriate governance structure; and, the design and use of particular 
mechanisms – management control systems (MCS) – that are embedded within the governance 
structure (Grandori & Soda 1995; Ménard 2013; Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman 2000).5 
Most early accounting research concerning the choice of governance structure have explored the 
two alternatives in the classic ‘make-or-buy decision’ in TCE (Williamson 1971, 1975) – market 
and hierarchical governance (e.g. Anderson, Glenn & Sedatole 2000; Balakrishnan et al. 2010; 
Roodhooft & Warlop 1999; Speklé 2001; Widener & Selto 1999). However, more recently 
researchers have explored the role of a third alternative – the option to ‘ally’ (Anderson & 
Dekker 2010), which refers to the choice of ‘hybrid governance’ (Williamson 1985, 1991).6 
Within organizational economics, hybrid governance is defined as any arrangement “in which 
two or more partners pool strategic decision rights as well as some property rights while 
simultaneously keeping distinct ownership over key assets” (Ménard 2013, p.1066).7 The 
pooling of specialised assets creates interdependencies between the parties that require collective 
planning, decision-making and coordination (Ménard 2004). Also, because parties remain 
autonomous (i.e. not completely integrated within a common ownership structure), they risk 
conflict over the distribution of collective gains and partner competition (Ménard 2013). 
The choice to ‘ally’ within hybrid governance structure is not a singular decision; rather it 
prompts parties to consider a diverse array of organisational forms with varying attributes and 
governance properties (Ménard 2004, 2013). Hybrids include joint ventures, subcontracting, 
strategic alliances, franchising, supplier parks, co-location, partnerships, consortia, cartels, trade 
associations, licensing agreements, supply chain systems, cooperatives, networks, reciprocal 
trading and long-term contracts (Barney & Hesterly 2006; Grandori & Soda 1995; Macher & 
Richman 2008; Ménard 2004, 2006, 2013; Ménard & Shirley 2005; Powell 1990; Shelanski & 
Klein 1995; Williamson 1991). As a way of organising this variation, scholars suggest that 
hybrids exist across a spectrum ranging from more market-like forms, such as contractual 
                                                 
5 Other conceptualisations of control responses include broad ‘patterns of control’ (Van der Meer-Kooistra & 
Vosselman 2000), MCS archetypes (Speklé 2001), individual MCS mechanisms (Langfield-Smith & Smith 2003), 
and transactional contracts  (Anderson & Dekker 2005; Dekker 2008). 
6 While the term ‘hybrid’ is used in Coase-Williamson economics, it corresponds to the ‘alliances’, ‘networks’, 
‘clans’ and ‘symbiotic arrangements’ studied in sociology and management (Grandori & Soda 1995; Ménard 2013; 
Oliver & Ebers 1998). 
7 This definition is broader than the dyadic buyer-supplier relationships that have typically been studied in 
accounting (Lind & Thrane 2010). We have intentionally chosen this definition as a way of exploring the 
implications of variation in hybrid governance structures.  
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arrangements, to hierarchy-like forms, such as joint ventures and equity based alliances (Gulati 
& Singh 1998; Ménard 2013; Oxley 1997; Pisano 1989; Sampson 2004).  
In terms of their capacity to control, hybrids’ mix of specialized asset pools and partner 
autonomy exposes parties to opportunism that cannot be mitigated through the price mechanism 
or managerial fiat found respectively in markets or hierarchies (Geyskens, Steenkamp & Kumar 
2006; Ménard 2013; Rindfleisch & Heide 1997). Instead, hybrids enact governance through their 
structural features, such as formalisation,  centralisation of decision, property and managerial 
rights and relational governance (Geyskens, Steenkamp & Kumar 2006; Grandori & Soda 1995; 
Gulati & Singh 1998; Joskow 1988; Ménard 2004, 2006, 2013; Powell 1990; Rindfleisch & 
Heide 1997; Shelanski & Klein 1995; Williamson 1979, 1983, 1996). 
Formalisation concerns the reliance on explicit contractual agreements, which comprises both 
exchange contracts that outline the terms of the goods and service exchange, and associational 
contracts that prescribe the organisation of the relationship (Grandori & Soda 1995; Joskow 
1988; Ménard 2004). These operate by specifying ex ante rules for gain-sharing, partner rights, 
monitoring and control mechanisms, dispute resolution and penalties (Ménard 2004, 2013; 
Williamson 1996). In contrast to market-based exchange, hybrids tend to use ‘contracts as 
frameworks’, which are relatively incomplete, giving a broad indication of how relations may 
vary and provide guidance and indications of resolution processes should relations cease to work 
(Williamson 1991). 
Centralisation can be differentiated into two components (Ménard 2013). First, the centralisation 
of the property rights over pooled assets, through equity swaps, hostage arrangements or creation 
of formal equity-based entities (e.g. joint ventures), which bonds parties to the collective 
endeavour and makes opportunism costly (Williamson 1983). Second, the centralisation of rights 
to manage partners (Ménard 2013), such as through creation of central authority entities. This 
addresses opportunism through monitoring of activities, determining the allocation of collective 
gains, disciplining recalcitrant parties, and resolving internal disputes (Grandori & Soda 1995; 
Ménard 2013).  
Finally relational governance (or ‘relational contracting’), refers to the reliance on parties’ 
identity and reputation in partner selection, as well as the development of close and enduring 
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organisational ties, relational norms, and repeated exchanges (Rindfleisch & Heide 1997). This 
attenuates opportunism by screening the reliability of potential partners as well as developing 
‘transactional reciprocity’ (Klein, Crawford & Alchian 1978; Ménard 2004), acting as a self-
enforcing safeguard because the value of future business is sufficiently large that “neither partner 
wishes to renege” (Geyskens, Steenkamp & Kumar 2006, p.522). 
Significantly, the structural dimensions describing how hybrids enact governance appear to be 
useful in describing the variation between market-like and hierarchy-like hybrid governance 
structures (Grandori & Soda 1995; Ménard 2004, 2013). These are summarised in Table 2. 
<INSERT TABLE 2 HERE> 
Market-like hybrids, such as long-term contractual arrangements, are characterised by low 
centralisation as they do not involve an exchange of equity or the creation of a separate entity 
(Gulati & Singh 1998) and parties retain autonomy over their own operations (Sampson 2004). 
There is a low degree of relational governance, possibly with the exception of the reliance on 
prior exchanges as the basis of partner selection. Instead, market-like hybrids tend to rely on the 
safeguards within the formalised contractual arrangements (Gulati & Singh 1998; Oxley 1997).  
Hierarchy-like hybrids, such as joint ventures, long-term strategic alliances or minority equity 
investments, refer to arrangements where the partners share or exchange equity (Gulati & Singh 
1998; Pisano 1989). They typically have a more centralised management structure, such as a 
board of directors (Pisano 1989) and there is high reliance on relational governance through 
selective inclusion of a limited number of partners. Formalisation is also typically high, as parties 
use associational contracts to negotiate their contributions, responsibilities and distribution of 
joint income (Gulati & Singh 1998; Oxley 1997).   
In terms of conceptualising the choice of embedded MCS, there are many alternative frameworks 
the inter-organisational control literature (e.g.Kamminga & Van der Meer-Kooistra 2007; Speklé 
2001; Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman 2000). In this paper, we follow Dekker (2004) in 
classifying embedded MCS in terms of different mechanisms. We focus on four types of MCS 
including: planning; monitoring and reporting systems; incentives; and social-based mechanisms. 
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Planning mechanisms involve “pre-setting schedules, outcomes and targets; and rules, programs 
and procedures” (Gulati & Singh 1998, p.786). Planning devices mitigate opportunism by setting 
collective goals, assigning responsibilities and specifying targets that can serve the basis of 
future performance evaluation (Gulati & Singh 1998; Langfield-Smith 2008; Langfield-Smith & 
Smith 2003; Mouritsen, Hansen & Hansen 2001). 
Monitoring and reporting systems involve the supervision and evaluation of partners’ activities 
and output to ensure they are compliant with the agreed procedures and performance targets  
(Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman 2000). They address cooperation control problems 
because they “reduce information asymmetry and make shirking or failure to provide 
information either more difficult or less favorable…[and] they assume an important signalling 
function, since they serve to indicate that opportunistic behavior will not only be detected, it 
could also have negative effects on a company’s reputation” (Neumann 2010, p.223). 
Incentives provide rewards contingent on the measurable outputs captured by monitoring and 
performance reporting systems. They include financial rewards, such as forms of profit-sharing 
(Dekker 2004), as well as promotions, where suppliers are offered opportunities for more 
favourable contracts (Gietzmann 1996; Gietzmann & Larsen 1998). Incentives induce 
collaborative behaviour by aligning partners’ individual objectives with the alliance’s overall 
objectives (Gulati & Singh 1998; Neumann 2010; Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman 2000) 
and by making recalcitrant behaviour costly (Speklé 2001). 
Finally, hybrids rely on social-based mechanisms or ‘trust-building mechanisms’8 (Das & Teng 
1998; Dekker 2004; Phua, Abernethy & Lillis 2011). These practices aim to develop trust9 
between hybrid partners, which can act an informal self-enforcing safeguard (Birnberg 1998; 
Dekker 2004; Langfield-Smith & Smith 2003). Trusting relationships are likely to be more 
durable, even in situations of conflict, as partners will seek to promote the other’s interests and 
“increase the predictability of mutual behaviour through each party honouring commitments and 
                                                 
8 Trust-building mechanisms include deliberate risk taking, high levels of interaction between partners, joint goal 
setting, problem solving and decision-making, open book agreements, intentionally incomplete contracts, and 
concern by managers for the maintenance of the parents organisations’ reputation as a trading counterpart (Das & 
Teng 1998; Dekker 2004) 
9 Trust can be conceived at a very general level describes a willingness to be vulnerable to another party, based on 
positive expectations about the likelihood a trusted partner behaves in a desirable way (Dekker 2004; Donada & 
Nogatchewsky 2006; Johansson & Siverbo 2011; Langfield-Smith 2008; Langfield-Smith & Smith 2003; Phua, 
Abernethy & Lillis 2011; Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman 2000). 
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allowing partners to deal with unforeseen contingencies in mutually acceptable way” (Langfield-
Smith & Smith 2003, p.284). 
Interdependencies in control responses 
Researchers rarely make their assumptions about the relation between hybrid governance 
structure and embedded MCS explicit. Therefore, to understand the possible nature of the 
relations between these two control responses we reviewed how existing studies in the inter-
organisational management control literature have conceptualised the co-existence of hybrid 
structure and MCS. This review revealed at least three different ways researchers have 
approached the relation between hybrid governance structure and MCS. 
The first way is to approach hybrid structures – or ‘inter-organisational relationships’ – as the 
context for the control enacted by MCS. For example Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman 
(2000) use hybrid attributes, such as number of potential partners or the degree of symmetry in 
bargaining power, as explanatory variables to predict variation in ‘patterns of control’. Studies 
using this approach show that embedded MCS vary with elements in their structural context (e.g. 
Donada & Nogatchewsky 2006; Langfield-Smith 2008; Langfield-Smith & Smith 2003). 
However, as this approach tends to overlook the control capacity of the structures themselves, it 
risks overestimating the role of MCS in addressing cooperation problems. This is likely why 
researchers have called for a more ‘combinative view’, advocating for investigations into the 
simultaneous use multiple control responses (Anderson & Dekker 2010; Caglio & Ditillo 2008). 
The second approach towards hybrid-MCS relations is the development of typologies of 
particular combinations of hybrid structure and MCS.  For instance, Speklé ‘s (2001) taxonomy 
of ‘management control system archetypes’ specifies distinctive mixes of MCS expected to be 
used within different types governance modes. This type of approach recognises that control 
problems are addressed by the combination of both governance structure and the embedded MCS 
(e.g. Kamminga & Van der Meer-Kooistra 2007; Sartorius & Kirsten 2005; Vosselman 2002). 
However, it implies that the types embedded MCS are constitutive of the type of hybrid, which 
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appears to collapse what might be separable and distinct control responses into a singular 
consideration.10  
The demarcation between different types of control responses is more evident in a few studies 
using a third approach, which conceives of MCS as responses to safeguard misalignment in the 
choice of governance structure11 (Anderson & Dekker 2005; Dekker 2004; Johansson & Siverbo 
2011; Phua, Abernethy & Lillis 2011). This approach builds on the notion of an ‘extended make-
or-buy-decision’, which is a path-dependent view of control responses that assumes that parties 
first decide the choice of governance structure and then subsequently the choice of MCS 
embedded within the arrangement (Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman 2000). Under a 
‘misalignment view’, the choice of MCS is framed by the adequacy of the hybrid governance 
structure to address cooperation hazards presented by a given transaction. Perhaps the best 
example is Johansson and Siverbo (2011), who argue that the intensity of the use of MCS is 
determined, in part, by the degree of misalignment in the decision to outsource. By analysing 
outsourcing decisions made by public sector organisations, they demonstrate that in situations 
when the initial choice to outsource appears misaligned to the level of cooperation hazards there 
is more intense use of MCS, and also correspondingly that organisations which tend to ‘under-
outsource’ use MCS less intensely. However, as these results were based on an aggregate 
estimate of outsourcing misalignment (i.e. a single measure for each organisation for all 
cooperation hazards and transactions), there remains scope to take a more fine-grained approach 
to examine if MCS are used within a given structure to safeguard for misalignment for particular 
control problems or sets of transactions. In addition, as there have been few other studies in 
accounting using this approach there remains substantial scope to explore, besides the level of 
                                                 
10 For example, often variation in the entire hybrid-MCS archetype is predicted using the same transactional 
variables, implying that each different type of transaction would require its own architecture and MCS 
configuration. This also would appear to be problematic in explaining how hybrids facilitate more than one type of 
transaction, or for inter-organisational arrangements that change frequently over time. 
11 Alignment is central to TCE theory, which expects an efficient alignment between the severity of contractual 
problems and the cost and complexity of alternative governance modes (Williamson 1985, 1991). Governance 
structures are expected to converge towards equilibrium in the long-term, however, in assuming bounded rationality 
of human managers, TCE also accommodates the possibility of misalignment in the short-term (Williamson 1985). 
Governance misalignment may occur either through the selection of a governance structure that does not provide 
adequate safeguards for relatively high levels of contractual hazard, thus exposing parties to the cost of unmitigated 
opportunism, or alternatively through the selection of an unnecessarily intensive governance mode for relatively low 
contractual hazards that introduces the costs of excessive bureaucracy (Leiblein, Reuer & Dalsace 2002; Sampson 
2004; Williamson 1985).  
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intensity, how MCS compensate for hybrid governance structure misalignment and how these 
interdependencies hold across alternative types of hybrid governance.  
Summary 
In inter-firm transactions we can conceive of at least three cooperation control problems that may 
occur at successive contractual phases, which parties can respond to through at least two types of 
control responses. The control responses we investigate include the hybrid governance structure, 
which is characterised by a combination of formalisation, centralisation and relational 
governance, and embedded MCS including planning, monitoring and reporting systems, 
incentives and social-based systems. Our empirical analysis will focus on examining whether 
there are consistent patterns in how these control responses combine to address each of the three 
cooperation control problems, with a view of assessing how control is enacted by the hybrid 
governance structure, and the extent to which this structural control capacity influences the 
design and use of embedded MCS.  
3. Empirical approach 
In order to explore the how the decision to ally shapes the choice of embedded MCS, we 
conducted a comparative qualitative case study of two inter-organisational arrangements used to 
manage inter-organisational R&D exchanges in the Australian cotton industry.  
Inter-organisational R&D transactions appear to be a rich site to investigate the management of 
cooperation control problems. Seen through a TCE lens, the specialised, uncertain traits that are 
not only inherent, but also desirable attributes of R&D activities, appear to represent the type of 
complex transactional situations most conducive to cooperation issues (Williamson 1979, 1985, 
1991, 2010). For example, R&D projects often require researchers to possess highly specialised 
knowledge, expertise, and equipment that cannot be easily transferred to other activities (Ditillo 
2004); they are characteristically unpredictable, and difficult to observe and monitor (Abernethy 
& Brownell 1997; Davila 2000); and they often are non-recurring and idiosyncratic (Jørgensen & 
Messner 2010). 
The intent of the multiple case study approach is to enable theory development (Creswell 2007; 
Eisenhardt & Graebner 2007; Yin 2003) by studying whether discernible patterns between the 
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three cooperation control problems, hybrid structural characteristics and embedded MCS held 
consistently across the two cases.12 These two cases are the Cotton Research and Development 
Corporation (CRDC) and the Cotton Cooperative Research Centre (Cotton CRC). These pair of 
cases provides a natural experiment to examine the implications of hybrid variation. While they 
represent different hybrid governance structures – the CRDC operates as a subcontracting 
arrangement while the Cotton CRC is an equity-based joint venture - they share similar 
institutional and operating environments. Both arrangements were established in the early 1990s 
through federal government programs, with similar mandates to invest collective pools of 
resources into R&D projects that will benefit the Australian cotton industry. Both also are 
headquartered in the same regional location in one of the primary cotton growing regions and 
close to the Australia Cotton Research Institute (ACRI) – a facility that houses scientists who 
specialise in cotton-related disciplines from various public science institutions. Both the Cotton 
CRC and CRDC operate by concurrently funding several hundred short-term project contracts, 
and make the outcomes publically available to grower and community end users. Both have 
invested heavily in production-related R&D since their inception, which has been conducted by a 
similar pool of cotton-specialist research providers. Furthermore, over time, both entities have 
diversified their research programs into environmental, economic and social science research, 
contracting with a broader range of providers who do not necessarily have prior experience in 
cotton R&D.  
The study’s primary data source was a collection of 64 interviews with members of the 
organisations involved in the CRDC or Cotton CRC (see Table 3). These included members of 
the central entities, the industry peak body, research provider organisations, commercial cotton 
organisations and members of the broader research extension network servicing the industry (see 
Table 4). 
<INSERT TABLE 3 AND TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE> 
                                                 
12 Each ‘case’ is a distinct inter-organisational arrangement that facilitates R&D exchanges. At the centre of each 
case is an entity that administers these exchanges; however, the case study also includes the relevant exchange 
parties. These parties include the commercial or government parties who provide funds or financial resources 
(‘R&D funders’); science-based research organisations who conduct research activities (‘R&D providers’), and 
other organisations that mediate the exchange (e.g. advisory bodies). 
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The interview data was combined with observational data gathered through 11 site visits and 
field trips over two years (see Table 5). These provided opportunities to observe the activities 
involved in the conduct, contracting and dissemination of R&D within the industry, how certain 
management processes occurred and how different organisational members behaved and 
interacted with one another.  
<INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE> 
In addition, throughout this period we gathered a substantial amount of archival documentation 
(see Table 6). Some of these documents provided background information about the industry. 
Others, such as strategic plans, provided detailed information about the nature of R&D 
exchanges. Finally, the annual reports, annual plans, internal management documents and 
statutory governance documents were directly relevant for understanding the design of the 
control structures and mechanisms of the arrangements.  
<INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE> 
The development of theoretical implications from the data followed an abductive approach13 
(Peirce 1960) involving the ‘systematic combining’(Dubois & Gadde 2002) of the case material 
and conceptual framework through multiple rounds of data collection and analysis14. The intent 
of these successive phases, which iterated between making empirical observations and drawing 
on explanations from existing concepts, was to achieve a ‘matching’ of theory and reality in 
order to develop and refine the existing theoretical frameworks (Dubois & Gadde 2002; 
Eisenhardt 1989). 
Our theoretical insights about the inter-dependencies of control responses emerged from three 
successive strategies in the data analysis. The first strategy was descriptive, where we coded, 
collated and combined the data and developed standalone accounts of the each case’s operating 
                                                 
13 Whereas deductive approaches develop theory a priori based upon premises from existing literature, and 
inductive approaches develop theory from empirical observations, abductive approaches start with the observation 
of a surprising phenomenon, followed by the application and refinement of existing theory, to explain what has been 
observed (Blaikie 1993, 2010; Bryman 2004; Dubois & Gadde 2002; Modell 2005; Patton 2002). 
14 The research began with an initial familiarisation of the R&D management literature and the cotton industry 
setting. This was followed by a more extensive period of data collection and initial data analysis. This informed the 
selection and development of the TCE framing of the study, which was then followed by another smaller round of 
data collection and more extensive data analysis, refinement of the theoretical framework and the development of 
theoretical implications. 
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context, problems and control responses. The second strategy assessed the control solving 
capacity of each case’s hybrid structures and MCS. This involved a process of ‘pattern-
matching’ (Eisenhardt 1989; Miles & Hubermann 1994; Patton 2002; Saldaña 2013), where we 
looked for evidence of the three cooperation control problems in each case, and then assessed the 
adequacy of the hybrid governance structure and MCS control responses (a detailed description 
of this strategy is outlined in the Appendix). Finally, the third strategy aimed to discern 
consistent cross-case patterns in the relations between hybrid structure and MCS. This was 
achieved using a process of ‘forced comparison’ (Eisenhardt 1989) of the two cases. Initially 
cross-case comparisons were descriptive, for example, seeking to compare the types of MCS or 
structures. These comparisons then became more explanatory, seeking differences and 
similarities in patterns of relations, between the reliance on MCS and hybrid structures at 
different stages of contracting and in relation to different transaction types. 
In the following sections we present the results of each of these three data analysis strategies. In 
Section 4 we present the summary descriptions of the hybrid structure and embedded MCS of the 
two cases (first strategy), as well as an explanation of how these control responses addressed 
each of the three cooperation problems (second strategy). Then in Section 5, we discuss the 
results and theoretical implications of cross-case analysis of hybrid structure-MCS relations 
(third strategy).  
4. Case findings 
Our empirical results show that despite similarity in their operating contexts, the two 
arrangements comprise different and distinct combinations of control responses to address each 
of the cooperation control problems, characterised by varying structural dimensions, structure-
wide MCS and project-level MCS. The CRDC and Cotton CRC’s structural characteristics and 
embedded MCS are summarised in TABLE 7 below. 
< INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE> 
The CRDC is one of 15 Rural Development Corporations (RDCs) established in 1989 under 
Commonwealth statute to invest in R&D on behalf of Australian agricultural producers and the 
Australian Government. It can be classified as a subcontracting arrangement as the central entity 
acts as an intermediary by allocating mandatory grower levies and matched-government funding 
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towards projects conducted by external research providers. It is designed to continue in 
perpetuity, with its variable levy funding dependent on the annual level of cotton production.15  
<INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE> 
The CRDC’s structure exhibits several characteristics of a market-like hybrid. As depicted in 
Figure 2, the CRDC relies on formal contractual relations that are completely mediated through 
the central entity. This vertical set of relations are highly formalised, with the use of long-term 
associational agreements with bodies representing grower and government funders, and use of 
short-term, arm’s length exchange contracts directly with individual external research providers. 
While there is high centralisation of investment decisions about the collective pool of funding, 
all parties involved with the CRDC remain highly autonomous. In particular, R&D providers 
retain high levels of discretion in the use of their own resources and how they operate to deliver 
contractual project outcomes. 
The Cotton CRC was established in 1993 under the federal CRC program which provided the 
initial funds for the formation of a collaborative R&D joint venture between government, public 
research agencies and universities, industry-related bodies and commercial cotton organisations. 
Under the CRC program rules, each CRC entity has a limited life of seven years to achieve 
certain objectives; however, the Cotton CRC has been renewed twice, in effect creating three 
Cotton CRCs that ran consecutively until 2012. It can be can be classified as an equity-based 
alliance as partner organisations contribute cash, in-kind and capital to a joint-venture entity that 
administers resources towards R&D project activities conducted by either partner providers or 
third party research contractors. 
<INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE> 
As a joint venture, the Cotton CRC has several hallmarks of a hierarchy-like hybrid. There is 
detailed ex-ante formalisation of resource contributions, operations activities and outputs in 
associational and exchange contracts between all contributing partners. There is moderate 
centralisation of property and investment decision rights within the separate jointly owned entity; 
                                                 
15 The grower levy is based on actual cotton production, which is highly variable, depending on the availability of 
water within catchment. Because the government levy matches the grower contributions, the bulk of the CRDC 
revenue stream is seasonal, tied closely to patterns of rainfall and cotton production. 
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even though property rights shift to the central entity, partner organisations have substantial input 
into the decisions regarding how their resource contributions are allocated to different R&D 
activities. There is high centralisation of rights to control, as central managers are granted high 
levels of authority to monitor and direct the activities of individuals within provider 
organisations. Also, as depicted in Figure 3, the formal contract relations sit within a broader 
lateral network of close relational ties between partner organisations, which are not necessarily 
mediated by CRC entity. 
In summary, despite the similarity of their operating and institutional contexts, the CRDC and 
Cotton represent two contrasting types of hybrid governance, each characterised by a different 
combination of structural dimensions. As will be explored below, this variation in hybrid 
structure, when combined with different embedded MCS, give each inter-organisational 
arrangement varying capacities to address each of the three cooperation control problems. 
Control responses to cooperation problems in the CRDC 
Figure 4 summarises the empirical findings about the CRDC’s control responses to the three 
cooperation control problems. 
<INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE> 
As is shown in the left column, there appears to be significant potential for negotiation problems 
in the CRDC due to the diversity of its funding constituents16 and external research providers. 
Also, its fluctuating resource availability shortens the likely pay-off period for providers’ 
investments in cotton-R&D specialisation to the length of the current project contract. 17 
Negotiation problems appear to be addressed through the CRDC’s sub-contracting structure, as 
the high centralisation of investment decisions to the Board of Directors enables the separation 
and mediation of the funder and provider exchange parties’ interests. This is accomplished by 
using different MCS to reduce negotiation issues on either side of the transaction. Funder-based 
issues appear to be reduced through efforts to develop long-term collective expectations through 
the creation of a single investment fund, the appointment of funder-representative bodies, 
                                                 
16 This includes up to 1400 cotton growers expecting industry-relevant R&D and Australian taxpayers expecting a 
‘public good’. 
17 This is in contrast, for example, with projects funded in a more stable environment, where providers may be able 
to expect - with greater certainty - the opportunity to use specialised assets on future contracts. 
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involvement of grower representatives in development of strategic plan and evaluation of project 
proposals. In comparison provider-based issues are reduced through facilitating market-like 
competition amongst providers, through open-calls and proposal processes that boosts number 
and diversity of applicants, annual decision-making processes and use of short-term contracts. 
The Board, supported by Program Managers, then has authority to make independent investment 
decisions that generally satisfy the parties but also ensure alignment to the long-term priorities of 
the CRDC itself.  
The middle column of Figure 4 shows that making inappropriate selection decisions are a salient 
concern at the CRDC because of information asymmetry gaps between decision-makers and 
research providers. These are potentially amplified by the turnover of independent Board of 
Directors and arms’ length relations with providers. Furthermore, decisions appear to occur in 
more complex scenarios, created by the perpetual nature of the CRDC, the fluctuating resource 
availability, the emergent process of operationalising open-ended long-term strategies, and the 
diversity of its project applications. To minimise the risk of poor investment decisions, the 
CRDC Board relies on intensive annual operational planning, including a two-stage pre-
investment project screening process. This process enables the collection and consideration of 
information supplied by providers; the evaluation of proposals by experienced Program 
Managers and panel members; relative portfolio-based comparisons of individual projects; and, 
development of standardised short-term project agreements, which provide contractual recourse 
for misrepresentation. 
Finally, the CRDC funders ensure contract compliance by holding the CRDC Board accountable 
for the monitoring and delivery of R&D outcomes as specified in quarterly and annual reports. 
The Board, in turn monitor research providers through dedicated Program Managers, who review 
regular project progress reports that account for the achievement key performance indicators 
specified in exchange contracts. However, compliance concerns within the CRDC are also 
relatively modest due to the broader incentives for providers to act cooperatively by make non-
fulfilment costly. For example progress report evaluations are tied to conditional project 
payments and contract renewal incentives motivate providers to deliver funder-relevant 
outcomes.  
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Control responses to cooperation problems in the Cotton CRC 
Figure 5 summarises the Cotton CRC’s control responses to the three cooperation control 
problems. 
<INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE> 
Given the diversity of party interests, the specialised nature of the projects and the low likelihood 
of transactional recurrence, it would seem likely that parties within the Cotton CRC would 
experience substantial negotiation problems. Despite these factors, many negotiation issues 
appear to be mitigated by the structural features of the CRC arrangement. As described in the left 
column of Figure 5, the co-contribution funding model creates lateral symmetrical relations 
between all participating organisations and ensures that they have a substantial equity and 
relational stake tied to the achievement of the collective goals. In addition, the collective 
planning of associational and exchange contracts enhances partners’ commitment to joint goals 
and also enables the allocation of specific operational activities. The involvement of providers in 
planning enables early negotiation of R&D outcomes that are both end-user relevant and 
scientifically feasible and valuable. The formal Agreements determine the parameters for project 
investment decisions, which bounds later negotiations once the Cotton CRC commences 
operation. Finally, any in-process negotiation problems are alleviated by the centralisation of 
residual investment decisions to members of company management team (CMT). 
The middle column shows that selection issues are relatively moderate because most projects are 
conducted by providers who are participating organisations. These scientific organisations have 
an equity stake in the achievement of collective goals and have less incentive to misrepresent. 
Their participation in decision making also minimises information asymmetry between the entity 
and prospective researchers. Also, the risk of poor selection decisions is mitigated by the detail 
and finite timeframe of the requirements of the Agreements, the use of the standard project 
evaluation criteria and collective evaluations conducted by the entire CMT. 
Out of the three cooperation problems, concerns about ex post compliance (the right column) are 
the most significant in the Cotton CRC. This is because of the specificity of the associational-
level contractual obligations and the time pressure induced by its limited life. Although this does 
not necessarily increase the chance of ex post contingencies occurring, it creates a lower 
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tolerance of variability and increases the cost of ex post uncertainties. There is a concerted effort 
to manage these concerns through intense use of monitoring and reporting systems. For example, 
at a project level, R&D activities and outcomes are monitored through six monthly progress 
reporting, monthly management by exception reviews by the entire CMT, and direct, yet 
informal project supervision by Program Leaders.  Centre-level outcomes are then monitored 
through quarterly financial reporting and annual reporting, bi-annual updates to partners, the use 
of an internal monitoring and evaluation system, and three external consultant reviews during the 
life-cycle of each CRC. The Cotton CRC also relies on the use of relational governance and a 
shared sense of joint ownership by providers to mitigate ex post compliance concerns. For 
example, it invests in regular workshops and conferences to bring together different providers 
and end users, in an attempt to socialise researchers to understand the value of collaboration 
towards collective goals and the relevance of commercial R&D outcomes. 
5. Cross-case analysis and discussion  
The individual case findings reveal how each inter-organisational arrangement addresses three 
different cooperation control problems through combinations of its hybrid governance structure 
and embedded MCS. In this section we analyse the cross-case patterns of these relations to return 
to the two research questions: first, how control is enacted at a structural level by alternative 
hybrid governance structures; and second, how alternative hybrid governance structures 
influence the design and operation of embedded MCS? 
The control capacity of alternative hybrid governance structures 
Our case findings align with broader economic literature (Grandori & Soda 1995; Ménard 2004, 
2013), in revealing the variation in structural characteristics of different hybrid governance 
structures. The more ‘market-like’ flexible subcontracting model relies on standardised short-
term contracts, supplier-competition, decentralised monitoring, renewal incentives, and arm’s 
length relations with suppliers; whereas the more ‘hierarchy-like’ equity-based alliance bounds 
partners through equity commitments and relies on high levels of ex ante formalisation, high 
centralisation of monitoring and control, and strong lateral relational ties between parties. These 
results show that different hybrid governance structures do not constitute equivalent inter-
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organisational relationships; rather they constitute structurally distinct organisational 
configurations for managing inter-organisational exchanges.  
Our results also reveal that structural characteristics of alternative hybrid governance are a 
significant source of management control in addressing cooperation control problems. The 
relative strength of hierarchy-like hybrids is their ability to create alignment between a diverse 
set of organisational parties towards a collective goal, through a combination of high 
formalisation, high centralisation of property rights, and intense, lateral relational governance 
between a selective group of parties. In addition, the specificity of ex ante formalisation, 
involvement of provider parties, and centralisation of the rights to control, also give hierarchy-
like hybrids an information advantage. This is because individuals responsible for decision-
making and control have the high levels of expertise that reduce exploitable information 
asymmetries. Market-like hybrids, by comparison, rely on a combination of supplier competition 
and incentive intensity, which are created by vertical relational governance, high centralisation of 
property and investment rights, and short-term exchange formalisation. Buyers can switch to 
alternative parties if providers attempt to engage in hold-up, misrepresent, or sub-optimise on 
any single transaction.  
Therefore, the type of hybrid is significant as different hybrid governance structures, 
characterised by different combinations of structural characteristics, will have alternative ways of 
addressing cooperation control problems. Furthermore, the variation in hybrid governance 
structures is significant as the nature of the hybrid structure as a ‘first-order’ control response 
will likely influence the imperatives for MCS control responses embedded within the structure. 
We can conceptualise the structural characteristics of inter-organisational arrangements – like the 
structural characteristics of traditional hierarchies – as both a source of management control and 
a context for management control (Fisher 1995; Flamholtz 1983, 1996; Flamholtz, Das & Tsui 
1985; Merchant & Van der Stede 2007).  
Differentiating between alternative hybrid-MCS relations  
Our results show that within each arrangement, the three different control problems were 
addressed by various combinations of hybrid structure and embedded MCS. The embedded MCS 
comprised of various mechanisms with varying degrees of scope: some mechanisms, such as 
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long-term strategic plans were used to manage the entity as a whole; while some mechanisms, 
such as proposal evaluation processes were used to manage at the project-level. Significantly, not 
all project-level MCS were used at all three contracting phases. For example, project planning 
was relied on in ex ante and contracting phases, whereas project monitoring and reliance on 
incentives occurred in ex post phases. In addition, not all project-level MCS were used 
equivalently for all types of R&D projects. We observed, for example, in the CRDC the use of 
non-standard project proposal processes for a core set of long-term providers in the production 
programs, and in the Cotton CRC, much more intensive project planning and monitoring of 
projects with non-partner providers in newer social research programs. By studying the patterns 
of variation in the use and scope of mechanisms across the two hybrid structures we are able to 
differentiate between what appear to be three types of hybrid-MCS interdependencies. 
The first type of hybrid-MCS interdependency exists in attempts to ensure MCS support the 
functioning of alternative hybrid governance structures. This was evident in the occurrence of 
consistent, logical cross-case patterns linking the variation of structural characteristics to 
differences in the design and operation of MCS. Observations consistent with this pattern can be 
seen looking across the rows of Figure 6.  
< INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE > 
As an example, one of the key structural differences was the degree of centralisation of the right 
to monitor and manage partners. Central staff within the CRDC had limited rights to periodically 
monitor providers’ contractual outcomes and providers retained substantial autonomy to control 
their own activities. In comparison, managers in the Cotton CRC had the rights to monitor not 
only outcomes of R&D projects, but also the ongoing progress of activities within projects. This 
variation in the intensity of centralisation of monitoring and control rights is reflected in the 
number of layers of monitoring and reporting mechanisms. For example, the right to periodically 
monitor in the CRDC is reflected in the reliance on bi-annual progress reporting; whereas the 
higher centralisation of monitoring in the Cotton CRC is enacted through a multi-level internal 
management structure who use numerous different types of project-level and structure-wide 
reporting systems and regular personal interaction between Program Leaders and researchers. 
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This perspective corresponds to the typology approach of conceiving hybrid-MCS relations (e.g. 
Kamminga & Van der Meer-Kooistra 2007; Sartorius & Kirsten 2005; Speklé 2001; Vosselman 
2002), whereby MCS are shaped by the functional requirements of the hybrids’ structural 
characteristics. These types of embedded MCS, which are designed and operated to support or 
enact the functionality of particular structural characteristics, therefore appear to have a 
‘complementary relation’ with hybrid structure. We can conceive of ‘complementary MCS’ as 
remaining distinct from hybrid structural dimensions, yet their operation improves the enactment 
of control by the structure (Milgrom & Roberts 1995). Our results show that the types of MCS 
likely to have complementary relations are structure-wide MCS that were implemented 
simultaneously with the inception of the arrangement, which corresponds to the decision 
scenario of complementary systems described by Grabner and Moers (2013). The close 
entanglement of complementary MCS and hybrid structure also potentially explains why 
previous researchers have viewed certain MCS as constitutive of particular hybrid governance 
structures (Gulati & Singh 1998; Ménard 2004, 2006, 2013; Speklé 2001).  
The second and third types of hybrid-MCS interdependencies we observe are both examples of 
attempts to design and use MCS to safeguard for relative deficiencies or weaknesses in the 
control capacity of hybrid governance structures. These both correspond to the ‘misalignment’ 
approach to conceptualising hybrid-MCS relations (Anderson & Dekker 2005; Dekker 2004; 
Johansson & Siverbo 2011; Phua, Abernethy & Lillis 2011; Sampson 2004), where we expect 
the use of MCS in situations when governance structures are insufficient to address the severity 
of cooperation hazard. As summarised in Table 8, we found that each hybrid structure exhibited 
comparative strengths and weaknesses in relation to certain types of control problems and 
particular groups of transactions. Their structural weaknesses appeared to be addressed by use of 
embedded MCS, particularly project-level mechanisms. This suggests that some embedded MCS 
have a ‘compensatory relation’ with hybrid governance structure, where ‘compensatory MCS’ 
are used to address the residual control problems that have not been adequately addressed, or 
even aggravated by the hybrid structure. 
< INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE> 
Significantly, we find two different types of compensatory hybrid-MCS relations. The first type - 
which we label ‘endemic compensatory responses’ – exists when particular control problems are 
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accompanied by the relatively higher intensity use of project-level MCS at certain contracting 
stages to compensate for misalignment that would occur for all exchanges administered within 
the hybrid. That is, endemic compensatory MCS are used to address specific cooperation control 
problems that are either not addressed, or perhaps even magnified by the features of the given 
hybrid structure.  
For example, we found the market-like CRDC to be vulnerable to negotiation problems because 
of the use of short-term contracts, centralised investment decision-making, and arm’s length 
relations with providers. Together these structural characteristics create uncertainty about future 
contract renewals and make it difficult to convince providers to make funder-specific 
investments (Gietzmann 1996; Gietzmann & Larsen 1998). Also, the centralisation of investment 
decision making exposes it to the risk of making suboptimal selection decisions, as it exacerbates 
the information asymmetry between the parties making investment decisions and prospective 
providers. Both negotiation and selection problems appear to be addressed through the CRDC’s 
more intensive use of project-level MCS. For example, negotiation problems appear to be 
minimised through the use of open calls and two-stage proposal processes that maximise the 
number of potential applicants and the personal mediation of the project proposals through 
multiple rounds of review by the Program Managers. In addition the use of more extensive pre-
screening and evaluation processes to reduce levels of information asymmetry. 
In the Cotton CRC, ex post compliance problems are particularly salient because of the 
specificity of the associational-level contractual obligations, the time pressure introduced by its 
limited life, and the collective responsibility to achieve the formalised associational agreements 
outcomes reduces individual partners’ incentives to perform (Alchian & Demsetz 1972; 
Williamson 1981). This risk of ex post non-compliance is addressed through intensive use of 
multiple monitoring and reporting systems. 
These empirical examples show that endemic compensatory hybrid-MCS relations align most 
closely with earlier studies of misalignment (Dekker 2004; Johansson & Siverbo 2011), which 
observed that that safeguarding of hybrid structure misalignment can be achieved through 
moderating the relative intensity of MCS. 
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The second type of compensatory relation we found occurs when specific cases of misalignment 
prompts idiosyncratic MCS responses. These ‘idiosyncratic compensatory responses’ appeared 
to occur when the hybrid governance structure appeared to experience problems in relation to 
particular sets of transactions. 18 
For example, the CRDC’s flexible subcontracting arrangement appeared to experience 
difficulties in negotiating R&D transactions with core providers because of high asset specificity 
arising out of ‘fundamental transformation’ that occurs with repeated exchanges (Williamson 
1985). That is, as individual researchers have repeatedly had their funding renewed, they develop 
cotton-specific expertise that becomes more difficult to replace. These transactions do not fit 
well within the competitive subcontracting model, as the high asset specificity creates funder 
dependence and opportunities for hold-up in negotiations. The CRDC appeared to respond by 
specific initiatives tailored specifically towards its nominated ‘core providers’ during project 
proposal processes, such as options to fast-track to FRP stages, offers of commissioned projects, 
and longer project durations.  
The Cotton CRC’s hierarchy-like equity alliance appeared to be well-suited to contracting with 
partner-providers; however, it was challenged in all three contractual phases by transactions with 
non-partner providers. This is because one-off transactions with non-partner providers are also 
characterised by relatively higher information asymmetry and higher asset specificity. Also, 
these transactions do not fit the equity alliance model as they are with parties who do not share 
existing contractual or social relations with the Cotton CRC who are not bound by the 
Agreements; who do not share a long history of working with Cotton CRC members; and who 
retain strong host-organisational affiliations. In response, the Cotton CRC employed full-time 
Program Leaders to manage research areas with non-partner providers, who used much tighter 
project initiation channels and spend considerable time screening, socialising and interacting 
with providers that appear capable and willing to deliver the Cotton CRC R&D outcomes. 
Based on these observations it appears that idiosyncratic compensatory MCS will be used in 
relation to certain transactions whose characteristics create cooperation hazards that the existing 
                                                 
18 Although we do not measure the degree of ex post control problems for all contracts administered within each 
hybrid arrangement, we do observe that within each arrangement, managers consistently identify certain sets of 
transactions as having a higher risk of opportunism. Furthermore, these particular groups of problematic transactions 
also appear to prompt idiosyncratic MCS responses. 
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hybrid structure and endemic embedded MCS control responses are insufficient to address. This 
type of misalignment arises because within a given hybrid arrangement, different transactions 
will present with varying severity of cooperation control problems, as each transaction is 
characterised by different levels of asset specificity, uncertainty, information asymmetry and 
frequency. As hybrid structures and a large proportion of embedded MCS used across all 
transaction types are relatively standardised and fixed, the nature and severity of misalignment 
will likely be transaction-specific. One implication of idiosyncratic MCS responses is that 
studying arrangements with significant transactional heterogeneity using a single aggregate, 
average measure of transactional characteristics, cooperation hazards and misalignment, will 
likely underestimate the absolute level of misalignment. In addition, based on the characteristic 
of alternative hybrid governance structures, we can explain why certain types of transactions 
were particularly problematic for each arrangement. For example, market-like hybrids are likely 
to be less well suited to repeated exchanges that create dependency, and hierarchy-like hybrids 
are likely to be less well suited to once-off exchanges with parties that are not contributors to the 
broader arrangement.  
The value of conceptualising alternative types of hybrid-MCS relations is conditional on our 
ability to differentiate complementary and (endemic and idiosyncratic) compensatory MCS. We 
propose three ways the types of interdependencies may be distinguished.  
First, the type of MCS-hybrid interdependency is likely to vary with the relative breadth of scope 
(Caglio & Ditillo 2008) of the embedded MCS. Our empirical results show that complementary 
relations tend to exist between hybrid structure and structure-wide MCS; whereas compensatory 
relations exist between hybrid structure and project-level MCS. This seems logical: 
complementary MCS are used to support the enactment and functioning of hybrid structures, 
therefore they would have a similarly wide breadth of scope; and compensatory MCS are used to 
address structural weaknesses in relation to either particular control problems (endemic 
compensatory) or specific sets of transactions (idiosyncratic compensatory), and will have a 
relatively narrower breadth of scope, targeted towards either specific contractual phases or 
specific transactions.  
Second, the type of MCS-hybrid interdependency is likely to vary by the degree to which the 
focal MCS is internally congruent with the overall ‘governance package’ (Johansson & Siverbo 
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2011). Broader package research suggests that complementary MCS will be characterised by 
internal congruence (Grabner & Moers 2013{Abernethy, 1996 #1006}). ‘Internal congruence’ is 
a term used in inter-organisational control research to describe the similarity of ‘patterns of 
control’ within an overall governance package or configuration (Johansson & Siverbo 2011), 
where each pattern of control manifests in the types of MCS used at different contractual phases 
(Donada & Nogatchewsky 2006; Langfield-Smith & Smith 2003; Van der Meer-Kooistra & 
Vosselman 2000). Thus, as complementary MCS support the enactment of the hybrid structural 
characteristics they will tend to form part of congruent ‘patterns of control’ (Van der Meer-
Kooistra & Vosselman 2000) in relation to the type of hybrid structure. For example, competitive 
bidding practices will be used to complement market-like hybrids such as subcontracting 
arrangements. In comparison, because compensatory MCS are used to counter-balance the 
control deficiencies of the structure, they will likely involve MCS associated with different 
patterns of control. For example, highly interactive, relational-based project negotiation 
processes will be used to compensate negotiation control problems in market-like hybrids. 
Third, different MCS-hybrid interdependencies will manifest in different cross-sectional patterns 
between or within alternative hybrid types. Complementary MCS may be identified as embedded 
MCS that vary with structural characteristics, but are only indirectly related to antecedent 
characteristics. Endemic compensatory MCS, like complementary MCS, will tend to be used 
consistently across all exchanges embedded within a particular hybrid, and likewise will vary 
with structural characteristics. However, as each hybrid arrangement has varying capacities and 
deficiencies in relation to different cooperation control problems, the use of endemic 
compensatory MCS will emerge in within-case variation in the use of MCS at different 
contractual phases. Furthermore, as different types of hybrids will rely on compensatory MCS 
for different types of control problems, we can also identify endemic compensatory MCS in 
between-case variation in the patterns of MCS use across contractual phases. Finally, as 
idiosyncratic compensatory MCS are only used in relation to specific subsets of transactions, 
they can be identified by examining within-case variation of the association between embedded 
MCS and individual transactions’ characteristics.  
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6. Conclusion  
The aim of this study was to explore how the decision to ally with alternative hybrid governance 
structures influences the design and use of MCS embedded within inter-organisational 
arrangements. By studying two different inter-organisational arrangements within the same 
operating and institutional environment we contribute two theoretical insights of hybrid structure 
variation for the design and use of inter-organisational MCS. 
The first insight is based on our finding is that there is variation in the extent that the two hybrid 
structures - characterized by varying degrees of formalisation, centralization and relational 
governance - address three cooperation control problems that occur in inter-firm transactions. 
This demonstrates that hybrids are not simply the generic inter-organisational context where 
management control occurs. Instead hybrid variation – ranging from more market- to hierarchy-
like structures – produces distinct control responses, at a structural level, to address cooperation 
control problems. 
The empirical results also provide support to both the typology and misalignment approaches to 
conceptualising interdependencies between hybrid structures and MCS. Some MCS – typically 
more structure-wide mechanisms – appear to be designed and used to support the operational 
functioning of the each hybrid structure. Other embedded MCS - typically project-level 
mechanisms – appear to be designed and used to compensate for deficiencies of each hybrid 
structure in relation to certain cooperation control problems or sets of transactions. Based on 
these results we explicate and differentiate between three types of hybrid-MCS relations 
embedded within an ‘extended make-buy-or-ally’ decision: complementary relations, where 
MCS enact the hybrid structure’s functioning; endemic compensatory relations, where MCS 
provide additional safeguarding for structure-wide deficiencies in relation to certain control 
problems; and, idiosyncratic compensatory relations, where MCS safeguard structural 
deficiencies in relation to particular sets of transactions. 
The study’s results reveal the potential for future research to enrich our understanding of inter-
organisational management control by recognising the control capacity and variation of hybrid 
governance structures. Rather than treating inter-firm arrangements as homogenous contexts for 
new forms of management control, accounting researchers can leverage the broader economic 
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literature on hybrid arrangements to develop more sophisticated and complete understandings of 
the control capacity of these different structures. Within this study we have only examined two 
relatively well-known hybrid governance structures; there remain many other lesser-known 
forms, such as franchising, supplier parks, cartels, licensing agreements, cooperatives, supply 
chain networks, and reciprocal trading agreements, whose MCS implications could to be 
explored.  
The results from this study also reinforce the view that control choices are interdependent within 
a more extended make-buy-or-ally decision (Anderson & Dekker 2010; Johansson & Siverbo 
2011; Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman 2000). In order to fully comprehend the 
interdependency of control choices, future inter-organisational studies should avoid examining 
MCS in isolation and instead adopt a more ‘combinative view’ (Caglio & Ditillo 2008) by 
considering how hybrid governance structures and MCS operate simultaneously. For example, 
future research could extend this study’s findings by examining the patterns of MCS within more 
extreme cross-sectional variation in hybrid structures to verify the associations between 
structural characteristics and certain types of MCS. Researchers could also use statistical 
research designs (e.g. using multi-level hierarchical modelling) to explore the emergent insights 
regarding endemic versus idiosyncratic compensatory use of MCS. 
 
Appendix 
The relation between potential control problems and control responses was assessed with 
reference the first-hand accounts provided by the CRC and CRDC managers, who sometimes 
provided explicit explanations of how particular practices or structures dealt with a problem, 
such as the use of pre-investment screening and evaluation practices to reduce the occurrence of 
misrepresentation by providers in the contract set-up. Managerial accounts also provided indirect 
evidence, such as their rationale, logic or intention in using certain mechanisms or practices; why 
structures or practices have been changed; or the perceived effectiveness of the control 
responses. Also, the interviewees familiar with both structures made comparative statements that 
highlighted the relative benefits or drawbacks of how R&D transactions were administered in 
one arrangement compared to the other.  
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However, as these accounts only provided a partial view of the management of control hazards, 
we supplemented the examination of managerial accounts with a theorisation process of 
‘disciplined imagination’ (Weick 1989, p. 516). Through a series of ‘thought trials’ we assumed 
the existence of the three potential cooperation control problems and considered how the hybrid 
structural dimensions and embedded MCS contributed to the minimisation of the problem, 
working systematically through each combination of the three control problems, the three hybrid 
structure dimensions, and four embedded MCS categories.  
We were mindful of the danger of developing ‘hagiographic’ accounts of the cases, and 
intentionally looked for ‘negative cases’ in the data (Patton 2002). Although both arrangements 
were considered to be successful overall, respondents did describe certain persistent problems in 
managing certain R&D projects. Because of the number of exchanges handled by each 
arrangement, we treated different sets of R&D exchanges as embedded units of analysis (Yin 
2003), and studied instances when control responses were perceived as less effective, or when 
particular transactions were more problematic, or when control responses had been adjusted. 
Based on the analysis of negative embedded cases, we refined theoretical explanations so that 
they were consistent with both unproblematic and dysfunctional contracting situation.  
Finally, in order to minimise the risk of confirmation bias, our preliminary results were discussed 
and refined with colleagues familiar with the cases and internal managers in subsequent rounds 
of interviews (Patton 2002; Yin 2003). 
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Figure 1: Preliminary conceptual framework 
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Table 1: Summary of types of cooperation control problems in R&D exchanges 
Phase Ex ante Contract Ex post 
Cooperation control 
problem 
Costly set-up and 
negotiation of projects 
Poor project investment 
decisions 
Difficulty in evaluating 
and enforcing contract 
compliance 
Potential opportunism Hold-up  Misrepresentation Hold-up; shirking; 
misrepresentation 
 
 
Table 2: Categorising hybrid variation  
 Market-like hybrids Hierarchy-like hybrids 
Organisational forms  Uni-lateral contractual 
arrangements, such as 
unilateral licensing or long-
term supply contracts; pooling 
contractual arrangements, 
such as technology sharing, 
cross-licensing, and joint 
research agreements. 
Equity-based alliances, such 
as equity joint venture; 
minority equity investments, 
such as direct investment 
arrangements 
Reliance on:    
- Formalisation High  High 
- Centralisation of property rights Low (uni-lateral) - Medium 
(pooling contracts)  
Medium (minority equity 
investments) - High (equity-
based alliances) 
- Centralisation of management rights Low  High 
- Relational governance Low High 
Relevant inter-firm accounting studies Gietzmann (1996); Gietzmann 
and Larsen (1998); Miller and 
O'Leary (2005); Miller and 
O’Leary (2007); Mouritsen, 
Hansen and Hansen (2001); 
Revellino and Mouritsen 
(2009)  
Dekker (2004) 
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Table 3: List of interviews 
Month Interviewee (Organisation – Position) Length (hrs) 
April 2012 Cotton Australia – Policy Officer 1.5 
April 2012 CRDC – Senior Manager 1.5 
April 2012 Research provider 1 – Private Consultant 0.75 
April 2012 Commercial cotton organisation 1 – Senior Manager 1 
April 2012 Extension – Consultant 1 
April 2012 Extension – Consultant 1 
April 2012 Extension – Consultant 0.75 
April 2012 Commercial cotton organisation 1 – Senior Manager (2) 1 
April 2012 Cotton Australia – Manager 1 
May 2012 Cotton Australia – Manager 1.75 
May 2012 Commercial cotton organisation 1 – Senior Manager 1 
May 2012 Research provider 2 – Research scientist 1 
June 2012 Research provider 3 – Senior research scientist 2 
June 2012 Cotton Australia – Staff (3) 3 
June 2012 CRDC – Program Manager 1 
June 2012 Cotton CRC – Program Leader 1.5 
June 2012 Cotton Australia – Policy Officer 1 
June 2012 Commercial cotton organisation 3 – Senior Manager 1 
June 2012 CRDC – Senior Manager 0.5 
June 2012 Cotton CRC – Staff 0.75 
June 2012 Cotton CRC – Senior Manager 1.5 
June 2012 Cotton CRC – Senior Manager 0.5 
June 2012 Cotton CRC – Program Leader 0.5 
June 2012 Cotton CRC – Staff (2) 0.75 
June 2012 Cotton CRC – Board Member 0.75 
June 2012 Cotton CRC – Board Member 0.75 
June 2012 Research provider 3 – PhD candidate 0.5 
June 2012 Cotton CRC – Program Leader 0.75 
June 2012 Research provider 4 – Postdoctoral Fellow 0.5 
June 2012 Cotton CRC – Board Member 1.5 
August 2012 Cotton Australia – Manager 1.5 
Sept 2012 Cotton Australia – Manager 1.5 
Sept 2012 Research provider 4 – Senior research scientist 1.5 
Sept 2012 Research provider 4 – Senior research scientist 1.5 
Sept 2012 Research provider 5 – Project Officer 1 
Sept 2012 Research provider 5 – Senior research scientist 0.75 
Sept 2012 Research provider 4 – Research scientist 0.75 
Sept 2012 Research provider 4 – Project Officer 1 
Sept 2012 Cotton Australia – Manager 1 
Sept 2012 Research provider 4 – Research scientist 0.5 
Sept 2012 Cotton CRC – Senior Manager 1 
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Month Interviewee (Organisation – Position) Length (hrs) 
Sept 2012 Cotton Australia – Manager 1 
Sept 2012 Research provider 5 – Research scientist 0.5 
Sept 2012 Research provider 4 – Postdoctoral Fellow 0.5 
Sept 2012 Research provider 4 – Senior research scientist 1 
Sept 2012 Research provider 4 – Postdoctoral Fellow 0.75 
Sept 2012 Research provider 5 – Senior research scientist 1 
Sept 2012 CRDC – Program Manager 1.5 
Sept 2012 CRDC – Senior Manager 1.5 
Sept 2012 Research provider 4 – Senior research scientist 1 
Sept 2012 Commercial cotton organisation 2 – Senior Manager (2) 1 
Sept 2012 CRDC – Senior Manager 0.75 
Sept 2012 Research provider 1 – Private consultant 0.75 
Sept 2012 CRDC – Program Manager 0.5 
Sept 2012 Cotton CRC – Senior Manager 0.5 
Sept 2012 CRDC – Program Manager 1.5 
Sept 2012 Commercial cotton organisation 4 – Senior Manager 0.5 
Sept 2012 Research provider 4 – Research scientist 1.5 
Sept 2012 Research provider 4 – Research scientist 1.25 
Sept 2012 Research provider 4 – Administrative Manager 0.75 
Nov 2012 Cotton Australia – Policy Officer 1 
Nov 2012 Cotton Australia – Staff 1 
Oct 2013 CRDC – Senior Manager 1 
Nov 2013 CRDC – Program Manager 1 
Total (64 interviews) 65.75 hrs 
NOTES: Of these 64 interviews, 59 were digitally recorded and transcribed; during the remaining 5 interviews, 
researchers took notes. Occasionally more than one individual was interviewed at once; where multiple interviewees 
were present the number has been included in brackets. In order to protect the identity of interviews, generic 
descriptions of their position have been used. 
 
Table 4: Number of interviews by organisation 
Organisation Interviews Interviewees* 
CRDC 10 8 
Cotton CRC 12 11 
Cotton Australia 11 9 
Extension 3 3 
Commercial cotton organisations  6 7 
Research providers 22 21 
Total  64 59 
NOTES: * The number of interviewees represents the number of individuals who were interviewed as part of the 
study. This varies from the total number of interviews as occasionally more than one individual was interviewed at a 
time (i.e. group interview), and some individuals were interviewed multiple times. The position of interviewees by 
organisation has been excluded from this table to maintain the anonymity of the participants. 
 
 
41 
 
Table 5: List of site visits and field trips 
Period Site(s) Location Duration  
Jun-12 University research providers Sydney 1.0 
Jun-12 CRDC; Cotton CRC; ACRI Narrabri 2.0 
Aug-12 Australian Cotton Conference Gold Coast 3.0 
Aug-12 Cotton Australia Sydney 0.5 
Sep-12 Cotton Australia Sydney 0.5 
Sep-12 ACRI; Cotton CRC; CRDC; other cotton organisations in Narrabri region Narrabri 11.0 
Nov-12 Cotton Australia Sydney 0.5 
Nov-12 Cotton Australia Panel review meetings; Cotton Australia AGM Sydney 2.0 
Sep-13 Australian Cotton Research Conference  Narrabri 3.0 
Oct-13 CRDC; farming operations in Narrabri and Moree region; ACRI Narrabri 5.0 
Mar-14 Cotton Australia Sydney 0.5 
Total (days) 29.0 
 
Table 6: List of archival documentation collected 
Scope Type of archival documentation 
Cotton CRC Annual reports (1993–2012) 
Cotton CRC Public documents about Commonwealth CRC program 
Cotton CRC List of current and completed projects (2005–2012) 
Cotton CRC Internal management documents (Board Book; Project management procedures manual; 
project evaluation template; Red Amber Green reports; Strategic Plans)  
Cotton CRC CRC Participants Agreement, CRC Commonwealth Agreement, CRC Affiliate Agreement  
Cotton CRC CRC Application material 
Cotton CRC Examples of calls for research proposals 
Cotton CRC Conference documentation and presentations 
Cotton CRC CRC Exit Book 
Cotton CRC External reviews of Cotton CRC economic impact  
Cotton CRC Examples of final project reports 
CRDC Annual reports (1990–2013) 
CRDC Five year strategic plans (1991–2018) 
CRDC Annual operating plans (1991–2013) 
CRDC CRDC Researchers Handbook 
CRDC Project evaluation templates 
CRDC Deed Agreement 
CRDC Productivity Commission Review of RDC Structures (review report and submission 
documents) 
Other Cotton Industry Research Development & Extension Strategy 
Other Cotton Industry Vision 2029  
Other Australian Cotton Growers Research Association Board Book (1974–2002) 
Other Australian Cotton Conference Proceedings (1984–2012) 
Other Australian Cotton Grower Yearbook 
Other Timeline of history of Australian Cotton Research Institute 
Other Australian Cotton Crop Statistics (ABARES) 
Other  Cotton Australia Annual Reports (1996–2013) 
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Table 7: Comparison of the CRDC and Cotton CRC 
 CRDC Cotton CRC 
Operating context 
Initiated In 1990 under the PIERD Act 1989 In 1993 under the CRC Program  
Funding basis  A mandatory industry levy collected from 
cotton growers matched by federal 
government contribution 
Contributing partners provide cash, capital 
and in-kind resources; Commonwealth CRC 
grant 
Resource 
uncertainty 
Variable, levy system subject to fluctuations 
in cotton production 
Confirmed funding over 7 years 
Lifecycle Perpetual Finite, three iterations of 7 years 
Hybrid structure 
Type of hybrid Subcontracting arrangement Equity alliance 
Formalisation Associational contracts: 
PIERD Act; 
Deed; 
Constitution; 
Exchange contracts: 
Standardised individual project contracts 
Associational contracts: 
CRC Program Rules; 
Bid application, Cotton CRC Agreements 
Constitution; 
Exchange contracts: 
Standardised individual project contracts;  
Initial project list 
Centralisation of 
property rights  
 
 
 
High centralisation of assets and property 
rights: 
Single collective investment pool from 
mandatory grower levies and matched 
government contributions 
Moderate centralisation of assets and 
property rights: 
Collective investment pool funded by CRC 
grant from Commonwealth government and 
untied contributions from partners; tied 
contributions from partners 
Centralisation of 
investment 
decision rights 
High centralisation of R&D project 
investment decisions, made annually by 
CRDC Board of Directors 
Moderate centralisation of R&D project 
investment decisions, where initial 
investment decisions made contributing 
partners as part of bid application; residual 
investment decisions made by Company 
Management Team (CMT)  
Centralisation of 
coordination, 
monitoring and 
evaluation 
Moderate centralisation of monitoring by 
CRDC entity (Board of Directors, Program 
Managers);  
Reliance on research provider organisations’ 
for operational control of R&D project 
activities 
Accountable to funder representative bodies 
(Cotton Australia and DAFF) at different 
points in annual investment cycle.   
High centralisation of monitoring and 
operational control by CRC entity (Board of 
Directors, CMT, Program Leaders) 
 
 
 
Accountable to DIISR and contributing 
partners at different points in CRC lifespan 
Relational 
governance 
Vertical hierarchical demarcations between 
funders, CRDC entity and providers; 
relations completely mediated by the CRDC. 
Close relational ties with grower 
representatives 
Lateral collaborative network between all 
contributing partners. Demarcation between 
partner and non-partners.  
Close relational ties between CRC entity and 
partners. 
Embedded management control systems (MCS) 
Planning 
mechanisms 
5-year strategic R&D investment plan  
Annual operating plan 
Annual budget 
Cash reserves 
7-year strategic plan 
Annual operational plan 
Annual budget 
Open call and Preliminary Research 
Proposal/Final Research Proposal (PRP/FRP)  
Initial project list; tied contributions 
Open and narrow call 
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process 
Program manager, Cotton Australia panel  
and Board evaluations and feedback 
Commissioning strategic projects 
Program leader and CMT evaluation and 
feedback 
Commissioning projects 
Monitoring and 
reporting 
systems  
Monitoring by DAFF and Cotton Australia: 
Annual reporting 
Quarterly financial reporting 
  
  
  
 
Monitoring by Board: 
Reporting by Program Managers 
Monitoring by DIISR and Partners: 
 Centre Forum 
 Annual reporting 
 Quarterly financial reporting 
 3rd year and 5th year external review  
 CRC final evaluation 
 Monitoring by Board: 
 Reporting by CEO 
  
 Monitoring by CEO and COO: 
 M&E program 
Program manager monitoring: 
 6-monthly progress reporting 
 Quarterly financial reporting 
 Final reporting 
CMT monitoring: 
 Monthly Red-Amber-Green monitoring 
 Quarterly financial reports 
 Final report approval 
Program leader monitoring:  
 6-monthly progress reports 
 Direct supervision/interaction 
 Final reports and evaluation 
Incentives Growers annual financial contributions  
Continuation of CRDC program 
Partner equity contributions  
Project payments  
Future contract renewal  
Project payments  
Social-based 
mechanisms 
Maintain trust of funders in CRDC entity: 
Regular information exchange 
 Regular interaction between CRDC and 
Cotton Australia staff and panel members 
 Selection of independent, skill-based Board 
 Selection and retention of Managers  
Maintain trust of contributing partners: 
 Professional Program Leaders; in-kind 
managers from partners 
 Selection of independent skill-based Board 
 Regular information exchange 
  
 Build ‘collaborative culture’ between 
partners: 
 Interaction at conferences, workshops 
 Co-location with providers at ACRI 
 Socialisation of junior researchers 
 Design of joint projects 
Program manager personal interaction with 
researchers 
Prioritisation of core providers in project 
selection 
Assessment of reputation, prior ties in project 
selection 
Program leader personal interaction with 
researchers 
Prioritisation of partner-providers for project 
selection 
Socialisation of non-partner providers  
NOTES: The following abbreviations introduced in Table 7 are: PIERD Act - Primary Industries and Energy 
Research and Development Act 1989; DAFF – Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries; DIISR - The 
Department of Innovation, Industry, Science and Research.  
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Figure 2: Structure of relations in the CRDC 
NOTES: The following abbreviations are introduced in Figure 2: ACGRA – Australian Cotton Growers Research 
Association; DAFF – Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries  
 
Figure 3: Structure of relations in the Cotton CRC 
NOTES: The following abbreviations are introduced in Figure 3: DIISR – The Department of Innovation, Industry, 
Science and Research; CSIRO - Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation 
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Figure 4: Control responses to cooperation control problems at the CRDC 
Ex ante 
Negotiation of mutually satisfying 
project contract 
Divergence between industry, 
government and science interests; 
high asset specificity; low recurrence 
of transactions; fluctuating resource 
availability 
Contract phase 
Subcontracting arrangement: 
Broad associational formalisation, 
with short-term exchange contracts 
Centralised investment pool, with 
highly centralised decisions 
Vertical, mediated relations between 
funders, entity and providers 
Broad strategic plan and intensive 
annual operational planning cycle 
Mandatory grower contributions 
Funder trust in entity to find projects 
Independent Board Members 
Contract 
Selection and investment project 
decision 
Fluctuating funding availability; high 
ex ante information asymmetry 
between providers and funders; 
idiosyncratic project transactions 
Subcontracting arrangement: 
Broad associational formalisation, 
with short-term exchange contracts 
Centralised investment decisions 
Accountabilities for investment 
decisions 
Broad strategic plan, intensive annual 
operational planning, cash reserves 
Retention of Program Managers 
Ex post 
Ensuring compliance with project 
contract 
Ex post uncertainty and information 
asymmetry between providers and 
funders; increasing asset specificity 
during project  
Subcontracting arrangement: 
Short-term exchange contracts 
Centralised investment pool 
Centralised monitoring 
Accountabilities to funders 
Compliant relations with government 
Regular external reporting 
Board monitoring 
Retention of Program Managers 
Incentive to continue CRDC program 
Cooperation 
control 
problem 
Contributing 
factors 
Hybrid 
Structure 
Structure-wide 
MCS 
 
 
 
 
 
Project-level 
MCS 
Open call 
Two-stage PRP/FRP screening 
Panel review process 
Program manager ‘go-between’ 
Two-stage PRP/FRP process 
Program leader and panel evaluations 
Reputation considerations 
Future contract renewal incentives 
Program manager monitoring  
Progress reporting 
Payment incentives 
Future contract renewal incentives 
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Figure 5: Control responses to cooperation control problems at the Cotton CRC 
Ex ante 
Negotiation of mutually satisfying 
project contract 
Highly diverse set of contributing 
organisations; highly specialised R&D 
outcomes required; low recurrence of 
transactions 
Cooperation 
control 
problem 
Contributing 
factors 
Contract phase 
Equity-alliance: 
Highly formalised ex-ante 
associational and exchange contracts 
Centralisation of collective pool and 
residual investment rights 
Lateral relation ties between partners 
Detailed strategic/operational plans 
Dedicated partner contributions 
Partner trust in CMT/Board  
Selection of independent managers 
Collaborative culture 
Hybrid 
Structure 
Structure-wide 
MCS 
 
 
 
 
 
Project-level 
MCS 
Contract 
Selection and investment project 
decision 
Ex-ante project uncertainty; 
information asymmetry; idiosyncratic 
project transactions; diversity of 
organisational interests 
Equity alliance: 
Highly formalised ex-ante 
associational and exchange contracts 
Centralisation of investment rights to 
informed decision-makers 
Strong relational ties between partners 
Detailed strategic/operational plans 
Dedicated partner contributions 
Centre-level M&E program 
Partner trust in CMT/Board 
Selection of Program Leaders 
Ex post 
Ensuring compliance with project 
contract 
Ex post uncertainty and information 
asymmetry between entity and 
providers; reliance on specialised 
providers; time pressure 
Equity alliance: 
Specific contractual obligations 
Centralisation of partners assets 
Centralisation of control rights to 
professional managers 
Accountabilities to partners; 
Strong partner relational ties 
Board and CEO monitoring  
M&E program 
Annual and quarterly reporting 
External periodic reviews 
Collaborative culture 
Alternative initiation channels 
Collective CMT evaluation 
Program leader review, negotiation 
Prioritisation of partner-providers  
Socialisation of new researchers 
Program leader strategic gap analysis 
Collective decision-making by CMT 
Prioritisation of partner-providers in 
selection decisions 
CMT monitoring using RAG report  
Program leader monitoring and review 
of progress and final reports 
Budgetary control, conditional 
payments, project termination 
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Figure 6: Typology patterns showing variation in structural characteristics and embedded MCS 
CRDC 
Formalisation 
Cotton CRC 
Perpetual associational 
contracts between 
funders and CRDC 
Short-term exchange 
contracts with 
providers 
Emergent 
formalisation ‘contract 
as framework’ 
(contractual detail 
developed annually) 
Planning: rolling, broad strategic plans 
developed by Board with input from 
funders; intensive annual operational 
planning, based on standardised proposal 
processes with funder consultation 
Monitoring: DAFF and CA regular 
monitoring of appropriateness of entity 
decision-making; progress report 
monitoring by Program Managers 
Incentives: creates contractual incentives 
(financial commitment by funders; 
conditional project payments); and 
uncertainty of continuation of CRDC 
program and contract renewal 
Social: focus on maintaining funder trust to 
make effective investment decisions 
Finite associational 
and exchange contracts 
between all 
contributing partners 
Short-term exchange 
contracts with non-
partner providers 
Highly specified ex 
ante formalisation, 
(most contractual 
detail developed 
before commencement 
of operation) 
Structural characteristics MCS Linkages Structural characteristics MCS Linkages 
Planning: intensive preparation of bid 
application by partner representatives 
evaluated by government. Later investment 
decisions shaped by plan parameters 
Monitoring: regular CEO reporting to 
Board, bi-annual reporting to partners about 
investment decisions 
Incentives: creates partner equity incentives 
Social : independent Board Member 
selection; appointment of expert Program 
Managers; co-investment model reinforces 
lateral relations between partners 
Planning: intensive annual operational 
planning/budgeting by Board with funder 
and Program Manager consultation 
Monitoring: reporting of investment 
decisions in annual report to DAFF and CA 
Incentives: creates financial commitment by 
funders 
Social : independent Board Member 
selection; selection and retention of 
Program Managers; funder reliance on trust 
in Board to make effective investment 
decisions 
Commitment of all 
resources ex-ante by 
partners and 
government to CRC 
entity 
Partners given 
discretion in allocation 
of contribution; 
residual investment 
decisions made 
centrally 
Centralisation 
of property 
and 
investment 
decision 
rights 
Annual allocation of 
grower levies and 
government funds to 
CRDC 
Highly centralised 
investment decision-
making by Board 
  
Planning: stand-alone, detailed strategic and 
operational plans, developed ex ante 
between all partners; flexible annual 
planning to operationalise agreements 
Monitoring: highly specific DIISR and 
Partner monitoring of the achievement of 
specific progress and output goals; Board 
and CEO use of M&E program; intense 
monitoring of project progress and 
completion 
Incentives: creates contractual incentives 
(equity commitment by partners; conditional 
project payments) 
Social: contributes to collaborative culture 
between partners 
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Figure 6 (continued): Typology patterns showing variation in structural characteristics and embedded MCS   
Planning: high partner involvement in ex-
ante planning and latter project planning; 
design of joint projects 
Monitoring: regular information exchange to 
partners; regular interaction between 
Program Leaders and researchers 
Social: facilitate regular interaction at 
workshops and conferences; co-location of 
CRC with providers at ACRI; socialisation 
of junior researchers; appointment of in-kind 
managers and professional Program 
Leaders, CEO and COO; prioritisation of 
partner-providers in project negotiation; 
intense screening of non-partner providers 
Lateral network of 
relations between all 
partner organisations 
Close relational ties 
between CRC entity 
and partners 
Planning: use of open call and PRP process 
to maximise number of research 
applications; high consultation with funders 
Monitoring: provision of ‘below the radar’ 
annual reports to government; high 
information exchange with grower funders 
Incentives: reliance on contract renewal 
incentives 
Social: Build and maintain trust of grower 
representatives with regular interactions; 
retention of long-term Program Managers; 
assessment of reputation and prior ties in 
project selection; fast-track core providers 
to FRP and offer longer duration 
Relational 
governance 
Vertical, hierarchical 
relations between 
funders, entity and 
providers 
Close relational ties 
with growers; distant, 
compliant relations 
with government; 
arms’ length relations, 
open structure to 
foster provider 
competition; 
Prioritisation of core 
providers 
Monitoring: intense, multi-level internal 
monitoring structure, with numerous 
reporting practices (M&E program; CEO 
reporting; monthly RAG review, progress 
reporting, final report evaluation, Program 
Leader supervision); advisory through 
Centre Forum; DIISR and partners review 
annual reports, quarterly financial reports, 
and external reviews of CRC progress and 
outcomes 
Incentives: conditional project payments; 
right of project termination 
Social: physical proximity; regular personal 
interaction by Program Leaders; in-kind 
managers from providers; appointment of 
CEO, CEO, and independent Board 
Monitoring: Reliance on periodic, 
standardised progress reporting monitored 
by Program Managers, reported to Board of 
Directors. DAFF and CA review strategic 
and annual investment plans; review 
quarterly expenditure; review annual reports 
Incentives: use of conditional project 
payments; future contract renewals 
Social: independent Board Member 
selection; selection and retention of 
Program Managers; high information 
exchange and personal interaction between 
CRDC and CA staff and panel 
representatives 
Ongoing monitoring 
and control of 
operational activities 
centralised within 
strategic centre 
Centralisation 
of monitoring 
and control 
Periodic monitoring 
centralised within 
strategic centre  
Reliance on provider 
organisations for 
operational control of 
R&D activities 
CRDC Cotton CRC 
Structural characteristics MCS Linkages Structural characteristics MCS Linkages 
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Table 8: The relative strengths and weaknesses of each hybrid structure 
 CRDC Cotton CRC 
Hybrid structure type Flexible subcontracting Equity alliance 
 Market-like hybrid Hierarchy-like hybrid 
 Addressing different types of control problems 
Structural strengths Addressing compliance problems Addressing negotiation and 
selection problems 
Structural weaknesses Addressing negotiation and 
selection problems 
Addressing compliance problems 
Compensatory MCS (endemic 
response) 
More intensive project 
management processes ex-ante, 
e.g. two-stage PRP/FRP process 
More intensive ex post project and 
centre-level progress and outcome 
monitoring and reporting 
 Contracting different types of transactions 
Structural strengths Transactions that are short-term, 
arm’s length or once-off  
Transactions with partner providers 
or in R&D areas of partners’ 
expertise 
Structural weaknesses Highly specialised transactions 
with core providers or with longer-
term strategic value 
Transactions relating to new R&D 
areas with non-partner providers 
 
Compensatory MCS 
(idiosyncratic responses) 
Prioritisation of ‘core providers’: 
- Fast track to FRP 
- Greater discretion in 
project development 
- Longer project durations 
- Commissioning projects 
for strategic needs 
Management of communities and 
catchment programs: 
- Full-time Program 
Leaders 
- Reliance on 
commissioning  
- Intense screening and 
socialisation of providers 
- Regular personal 
monitoring 
 
 
 
 
